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ARGUMENT
Appellant Warr makes the following points in reply to
the arguments raised in the response briefs, Brief of Respondents, Boyce and Connell, and Brief of Respondent J. H. Ehlers.

POINT ONE
RESPONDENT EHLERS' ARGUMENT AT POINT ONE IS NOT PROPERLY
BEFORE THE COURT BECAUSE HE HAS NOT CROSS-APPEALED FROM THE JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST HIM.
In the proceedings below in the District Court, the respondents moved the Court to dismiss Warr 1 s brossclaim for
failure to state a claim.

It was claimed that because Warr

failed to tender the balance due under the real estate contracts,
his pleadings did not state a cause of action.

This motion was

denied by the Court and a judgment for contract damages was later
entered by the District Court.
issue before this Court.

Respondents again raise this

However, because the respondents did

not cross-appeal from the judgment entered in the District Court,
they should now be precluded from attacking the validity of the
judgment for contract damages.
The respondents are saying that Warr's only remedy
is for rescission of the contract.

However, Warr has never asked

for rescission of the contract.

Moreover, the Court awarded

damages for breach of contract.

The respondents' argument

attachs the validity of any judgment for contract damages.
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Both federal and Utah law recognize that a respondent

j

may not attack a judgment when he has not sought relief from
the appellate court by appeal.

The United States Supreme Cour

in Letulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415

(1940), recognized this

principal when the Court stated:
A respondent or an appellee may urge any matter
appearing in the record in support of a judgment,
but he may not attack it even on grounds asserted
in the court below, in an effort to have this Court
reverse it, when he himself has not sought review
of the whole judgment, or of that portion which
is adverse to him.
308 U.S. at 421-22.
Thie Court has recognized the same principal in

~

Land Bank v. Sorenson, 101 Utah 305, 121 P. 2d 398 (1942).

In

that case, the plaintiff bank was awarded a judgment for recovc

I

of possession of certain real property.

On appeal, the plain·

tiff argued that the judgment should be amended to provide for
the recovery of additional rentals, but because tl)e plaintiff
had made no cross-assignments of error and had taken no cross·
appeal, this Court held that the matter was not before it.

To the same effect is Ludlow v. Colorado Animal By-Pro~
Co., 104 Utah 221, 137 P.2d 347 (1943), where this Court held
that it was not required to decide whether the district court

erred in not granting injunctive relief where the plaintiff~•

pendent failed to cross-appeal for the failure to receive ~j~
tive relief after the defendant-appellant appealed the award oi
damages against it.
See also, generally, 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Error
§

707

(1962).
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POINT TWO
FORMAL TENDER OF AMOUNTS DUE UNDER THE CONTRACT WAS NOT
REQUIRED BECAUSE SUCH A TENDER WOULD HAVE BEEN AN IDLE CEREMONY
AND OF NO AVAIL
If the Court believes that the matter of tender of amounts
due under the real estate contract is an issue to be considered
here, it is submitted that Warr was justified in not making a
formal tender because such a tender would have been an idle ceremony and of no avail.

After the district court had entered its

judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on their adverse possession
claim, respondents no longer had title to the property, and it
was clear from that point forward that any effort to tender the
balance of the purchase price would have proven fruitless.
The familiar rule is that the law does not require one
to do a vain or useless thing and excuses the making of a formal
tender which would otherwise be required, where it is reasonably
plain and clear that if made, such a tender would be an idle ceremony and of no avail.

A recent case in point is Leger Construction

Inc. v. Roberts, Inc., 550 P.2d 212 (Utah 1976), where the plaintiff claimed that the defendant would have been entitled to an
extension of time under his construction contract only if he had
asked for it in writing.

In response, the Court noted the facts

that the plaintiff had failed to pay the balance on the contract,
that he had filed a legal action and that he had alleged in his
complaint that the defendant failed to comply with the contract
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despite the plaintiff's repeated demand upon him to do so.

The

court held that these facts
make it obvious that if Roberts had asked for an
extension, it would have been an idle gesture and
was unnecessary under the principle that the law
will not require one to do a useless or impossible
thing.
550 P.2d at 214.

To the same effect is Hansen v. Christensen,

545 P.2d 1152 {Utah 1976), where this Court stated:
Where the unreasonable conduct of the obligee would
make an actual tender a fruitless gesture, an
offer to comply with the terms of the contract by
the obliger is sufficient
545 P.2d at 1154.
Warr was ready and able to tender the payments required
to satisfy the contracts.

{Tr. 52, 53)

However, the respondents

i

were no longer able to deliver title to the property, the Court [
having declared ownership in the plaintiffs.

It clearly would

have been a fruitless and idle gesture to tender the balance due
under the contract to vendors who no longer had title and who
would have been required to pay multiples of the contract price
in order to purchase the property from the plaintiffs if the
plaintiffs were even willing to sell.

Respondents have shown

their unwillingness to have made such a purchase by their refusal
'

to pay damages under a "benefit of the bargain" rule.

They cannot!

now be heard to require tender in a situation where they could
not and would not have performed.
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POINT THREE
WARR WAS ENTITLED TO TREAT THE REAL ESTATE CONTRACTS AS
BROKEN BECAUSE THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY THAT THE RESPONDENTS
WOULD BE ABLE TO CONVEY GOOD TITLE.
This Court in the case of Corporation Nine v. Taylor,
30 Utah 2d 47, 513 P.2d 417 (1973), stated:
First, the law does not require the vendor to have
clear and marketable title at all times during the
performance of his contract, and is not ordinarily
so obliged until the time comes for him to perform.
The buyer should not be heard to complain unless it
appears that it will be impossible or at least
highly unlikely that the seller will be able to
perform his contract when he is called upon to do
so . . . .
513 P.2d at 421 (emphasis added).
In American Savings & Loan Association v. Blomquist, 24
Utah 2d 35, 465 P.2d 353 (1970), this Court shed light on the
meaning of the phrase "impossible or at least highly unlikely"
for the seller to perform his contract.

In that case, the defen-

dant Blomquist mortgaged his home to the American Savings & Loan
Association.

After making a few payments he went into default.

American Savings then sought to foreclose on the property.
While the foreclosure procedure was pending, Blomquist
sold his home to Sellars on contract.

American Savings later

added Sellars as a defendant in the foreclosure action.

Upon

being notified of this, Sellars refused to continue making payments
to Blomquist.

Blomquist then brought action against Sellars to

foreclose, and Sellars counterclaimed against Blomquist for breach
of contract, claiming that Blomquist was unable to deliver good
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title to the property.

Blomquist argued that Sellars could not!

bring an action until he had made or tendered all payments on t:,,
property and that al though the property was foreclosed, it was
still possible for him (Blomquist) to redeem the property.

It

appears, however, that such a possibility could not reasonably
give much hope to Sellars, because the Court said:
In the circumstances discussed above, where the
vendors (Blomquists) had first been guilty of
such a substantial breach of their obligations
under the contract, and where it appeared to be
an obviously futile thing for the Sellars to continue making payments, it was not obligatory upon
them to do so; but they were entitled to treat
the contract as broken, refuse further performance
and seek redress in damages resulting to them for
the breach.
465 P.2d at 355-56
In the instant case, following the judgment for the plai:
tiffs of adverse possession, the respondents had no interest
remaining in the property.

If the respondents were to perfonn,

they would have to obtain title from the plaintiffs.

However,

such a possibility should be considered insignificant here in
that no evidence was presented in trial that the plaintiffs were
willing to sell the property and because, most probably, the
respondents would have had to pay as much to purchase the propert
as Warr has asked for damages in this action.

That this is true

is borne out by the sale of the property in question by plaintiff
to a third party subsequent to the trial in this case.

Because

the respondents are unwilling to pay the damages as asked by wan
there is no reason to believe they would have purchased the prOP"
erty at a similar price from the plaintiffs.

Therefore, in linE
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with the American Savings case, Warr should now be able to seek
redress in damages.
Although the issues of tender and ripeness for decision
are not now properly before this Court, as stated in Point one
above, Points Two and Three show that Utah law would allow Warr
to obtain contract damages against the respondents.

POINT FOUR
THE RESPONDENTS HAVE MISSTATED THE CASE OF BUNNELL V. BILLS
CONCERNING ITS EFFECT ON THE MEASURE OF CONTRACT DAMAGES.
The case of Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597
(1962), is Utah authority directly on point that the "benefit of
the bargain" rule should be applied in determining damages in this
case.

The respondents, in an attempt to distinguish the Bunnell

case, misstate the facts or draw unsupported inferences therefrom.
In Bunnell, Bills sold certain real property to Stevens
on contract.

Subsequently, Stevens contracted to sell this prop-

erty to Bunnell.

Later, Stevens became aware that he would not

be able to meet his obligations under the contract with Bills.
Bills and Stevens worked out a rescission agreement so that
Stevens could receive back his $10,000 down payment.

Bills then

entered into a contract to sell the property to another party.
This, however, did not resolve the problem with the contract
between Stevens and Bunnell.

In Bunnell's action against Stevens,

this Court affirmed the trial court's decision that Stevens had
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breached his contract with Bunnell and that he should be requi~'I
to compensate Bunnell according to the "benefit of the bargain"
rule.
In the instant case, the respondents breached their con.
tract with Warr when it became impossible for them to convey the
real property in question.

The only significant difference

betw~

the two cases is that in Bunnell the seller was unable to convey
good title because the agreement to purchase for himself had
been rescinded; in the instant case, the respondents were not
able to convey good title because the plaintiffs had taken title
by adverse possession.
Respondents Boyce and Connell, at page 5 of their brief,
state that Bunnell involved a "bad faith" situation because of
the "underhandedness of the seller in selling to a second buyer
without regard to the rights of a prior buyer."
obviously misread the case.
buyer.

These respondent:

Stevens did not sell to a second

He was the major defendant in the case, the one who direct

breached his contract with Bunnell.

Although Bills contracted

with a third party after Stevens and he rescinded their contract,
Bills' involvement in the case was as a conspirator to induce the
breach of contract between Stevens and Bunnell.

This Court held

that Bills was justified in his action and hence not liable.

A1 51

there is nothing in the case that suggests that Stevens acted in
"bad faith."

A seller is not in bad faith in entering a contract

to convey real property when he does not have title to that prop·
erty if he reasonably believes that he can obtain title when it
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comes time for him to perform.

Therefore, Stevens was not in

bad faith by signing the contract with Bunnell.

Although it

later developed that Stevens was unable to meet the payments due
under his contract with Bills, there is no statement or inference
therefrom that would indicate that he had any doubt about being
able to meet his payments at the time he contracted with Bunnell.
There simply is nothing in the Bunnell case to indicate that
this Court believed that Stevens was acting in "bad faith."
Respondent Ehlers, in his brief, at page 9, claims that
Bunnell involved "bad faith" on the part of the vendor and that
Stevens "must have known that he would naver receive legal title
to the property due to his financial situation."

Again, it,must

be said that the Court makes no mention of "bad faith."

More-

over, there is no indication from the case that Stevens should
have known at the time he entered his contract with Bunnell that
he would never receive legal title to the property due to his
financial situation.

This is merely conjecture on the part of

Ehlers.
It is submitted that Bunnell puts Utah among those jurisdictions that follow the "benefit of the bargain" rule in situations not involving bad faith.

POINT FIVE
RESPONDENTS SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ARGUE THAT THE TIME
OF THE BREACH WAS AT THE TIME THE CONTRACT WAS SIGNED BECAUSE
THIS CONTENTION WAS NOT MADE IN THE TRIAL COURT BELOW.
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Respondent Ehlers, in Point Three of his brief, attempts
to establish the date of the contract as the date that the fair
market value of the property should be determined.

However,

none of the respondents raised this issue in the trial court
below.

In fact, Warren D. Osgood, Warr's expert witness as to

the value of the real property, testified concerning the present
value of the property, not the value of the property at the time
the contract was signed.

None of the respondents objected to

his testimony on that basis, although several objections as to
his qualifications, the foundation for his opinion, the value of
other pieces of property, and hearsay were made.

(Tr. 20-32)

Moreover, Mr. Boyce, counsel for respondent Ehlers, represented
that his witness as to the value of the property, Mr. Stan
LeCheminant, would testify that the property was worth $6,000
per acre without access.

(Tr. 64-65)

Mr. LeCheminant's testi·

mony as to value must refer to the same point in time as that
of Mr. Osgood because Mr. Osgood also testified that without
access, the property would only be worth about $6,500 per acre.
(Tr. 26)
Furthermore, it should be noted that Ehlers'

Memorand~

fo the Court, submitted in lieu of closing argument, at pages
3 and 4, argues that the maximum damages that can be recovered
are $6,500 per acre, stating that Warr's expert testified that
"without the adjacent acquisition, the present market value" is
$6,500 per acre.

Because the respondents have not argued the time of the
breach in the Court below, they should not be allowed to raise
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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it for the first time before this Court.

Contentions or issues

raised for the first time on review should not be considered.
state v. Larkin, 27 Utah 2d 295, 495 P.2d 817, 821 (1972); Riter
v. Cayias, 19 Utah 2d 788, 431 P.2d 788, 790 (1967); Tygesen v.
Magna Water Co., 13 Utah 2d 397, 375 P.2d 456, 457 (1962); Carson
v. Douglas, 12 Utah 2d 424, 367 P.2d 462, 463 (1962).
POINT SIX
IN ORDER TO DETERMINE "BENEFIT OF THE BARGAIN" DAMAGES,
THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY AS OF THE DATE RESPONDENTS COULD NOT
DELIVER TITLE IS DETERMINATIVE.
Appellant Warr contends that the issue of when to value
the property in question should not be before this Court for the
reasons explained above.

Nonetheless, if this issue is now

properly before the Court, it is submitted that the proper rule
is that "benefit of the bargain" damages should be determined by
reference to the property value at the time respondents could not
deliver title.
Appellant Warr in this action seeks contract damages from
the respondents for their failure to deliver title to the property in question.

The claim was brought in the nature of a

crossclaim against codefendants in an adverse possession action.
Title to the property was the only issue involved in the main
action and the crossclaim.

None of the defendants counterclaimed

against the plaintiff for possession of the property.
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The fact that the plaintiffs had possession of the p~~
erty or that the plaintiffs had corrunenced an action to quiet
title did not mean that the respondents would not be able to
deliver title to the property.

It was not until the court had

entered its judgment against the respondents and the time for
appeal had run that it was clear the respondents would not be
able to deliver title to the property.
Prior to judgment in favor of plaintiff in this case,

.
I

Warr had no right to rescind the contracts because any attempt to
rescind would have been met with an action for damages by the
respondents.

f

I
I

Moreover, whether the respottde!hts would have succeeij
I
I

against the plaintiffs below on the adverse possession questioo
depended on facts over which Warr had no control and of which he
had no knowledge except through the respondents.

!

The fact that

the respondents defended against the claim of the plaintiffs to

I

the extent of going to trial shows that they believed they had a

!

good defense to the adverse possession claim.
The case law also supports the concept that Warr would not
have been able to succeed in an action against respondents before,
the appeal time had run on the judgment because a vendor need
not be able to deliver title to the property until he is required
to transfer title.

See Leavitt v. Blohm, 11 Utah 2d 220, 375

P.2d 190 (1960); Woodard v. Allen, 1 Utah 2d 220, 265 P.2d 398
(1953).

Under the "benefit of the bargain" rule, damages should

be determined as of the time of the breach.

Because the breach

did not occur until the time for appeal had expired on the judg·
ment for adverse possession, the value of the property should
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J,

be determined as of that time, not the date that the contract
was signed.
The lawsuit by plaintiffs for adverse possesion of the
property in question was filed and the complaint and summons was
served less than one half year after Warr signed the contracts
to purchase the property.

Yet the testimony was unequivocal that

Warr continued to pay on the contracts for two years thereafter
without any suggestion from the respondents that the contracts
should be rescinded.

Warr was thus committed to the purchase

of the property until the District Court found in favor of the
plaintiffs.

It was only then that Warr was really free to use

the money which would have gone toward the purchase of the property in question to begin acquiring another piece.

But in the

meantime, the general rise in real estate prices would now prohibit
him from purchasing a similar piece for the same purchase price.
It is therefore only sensible and reasonable to value the
property at the time when Warr knew that the respondents could not
deliver good title and that he had full right to take action on
that breach.

POINT SEVEN
RESPONDENTS BOYCE AND CONNELL ARE PRECLUDED FROM ARGUING
THAT THEIR AGREEMENT TO GIVE A SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED PREVENTS THE
COURT FROM AWARDING CONTRACT DAMAGES AGAINST THEM.
The District Court below ordered contract damages against
all of the respondents, despite the arguments by respondents
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Boyce and Connell that they promised to give only a special war.
ranty deed to Warr.

They now argue in Point One of their brief

that this promise to give a special warranty deed insulates them ,
from damages.

However, Boyce and Connell have not cross-appealed

from the judgment of the Court.

I

Therefore, they are precluded

from raising that argument before this Court.

See the arguments

raised in Point One above.

POINT EIGHT
A COVENANT OF SPECIAL WARRANTY DOES NOT PUT A VENDEE ON
NOTICE OR INQUIRY OF DEFECTS OF TITLE
Even if the issue of the special warranty is properly
before the Court, that matter should be resolved in favor of Warr
because a covenant of special warranty does not put a vendee
on notice or upon inquiry as to defects of title.

A case in

point is Paul v. Houston Oil Co., 211 S.W.2d 345 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1948), where the Court stated:
It is true that this deed contains a special warranty but under the great weight of authority, such
special warranty does not carry any notice of defects
of title to the grantee. The rule is:
"So, too,
a 'special warranty deed'--that is to say, one that
is in terms a general warranty deed except that it
warrants the title only against those claiming
'by, through or under' the grantor--conveys the
land itself; the limited warranty does not, of
itself, carry notice of defects of title."
211 S.W.2d at 356.
Even assuming, arguendo, that Warr was put on notice of
possible defects by the special warranty covenant, thl.. s does not '
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i

help the respondents because, as stated above, the vendor does
not need good title at the time he contracts.

He has the entire

contract period in which to perfect his title.
Moreover, the facts of this case show that Warr's claim
under the Connell and Boyce contract arises because of the activities of Connell and Boyce in allowing the adverse possession to
take place during the time they held title to, or at least had
control of, the property.

The testimony introduced in the

principal action and on the crossclaim shows that Laron Boyce, the
husband of respondent Evelyn P. Boyce, was the agent for respondents Boyce and Connell for the payment of property taxes of
property in the estate of Mr. Pender, their father, from the date
of his death in 1963 to the present.

(Tr. 37-39)

Paragraph 1

of the Conclusions of Law in the principal action shows that the
plaintiffs, and no others, timely paid the property taxes for,
at least, the years of 1958 and 1965, inclusive, and that this
was the reason that the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment.
If Boyce had paid the taxes in 1964 and 1965 on behalf of respondents Boyce and Connell,

~he

plaintiffs would not have been suc-

cessful in their claim for adverse possession.

Moreover, had

respondents Boyce and Connell kept plaintiffs from using the
property from and after the date they obtained control of the
property until the time of sale to defendant Warr, any claim of
adverse possession would have been negated by a claim of adverse
possession against the plaintiffs.

Further, although Boyce knew
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that respondent Ehlers was a part owner in the property in ques1

tion, Boyce had no discussions with Ehlers, as to the payment

I
of taxes or otherwise, prior to the trial on the principal ~t~:
n,

(Tr. 39-40)

It would have been so easy for the respondents to

stop the adverse possession of the plaintiffs, but they failed
to do so.
Because the acts that caused the respondents Boyce and
Connell to lose the property and that gave title to the plaintiffs occurred through or under respondents Boyce and Connell,
they must answer in damages to Warr based upon the "benefit

of

the bargain" rule.
POINT NINE
REGARDLESS OF THEORY OF RECOVERY, THE APPELLANT IS
ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS.
I

None of the respondents responded directly to appellant 1:I
argument that he is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and
costs based on the contracts between respondents and appellant.

I
1

Their basic argument, of the respondents is that because the
Lower Court did not award appellant all that he had asked for,
attorney's fees should not be granted.
This lame argument completely ignores the explicit

,i

language of the contracts in question which provide for attorney'!
fees and costs in the event of a default.

The Court below

specifically found such a default, as discussed in Points Three
and Four of appellant's brief.

The case is therefore clear;

there was a breach for which Warr is entitled to attorney's

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-16-

fees and costs.

Any discussion of settlement offers is extraneous

and superfluous.

The only question of breach has been resolved

in favor of Warr.
POINT TEN
IF "BENEFIT OF THE BARGAIN" DAMAGES ARE NOT AWARDED,
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE INCREASED.
If "out-of-pocket" damages are to be retained in this
case, all parties agree that damages of $8,249.80 are insufficient.
Ehlers does not contend otherwise; Boyce and Connell state that
the amounts inserted in the judgment were furnished by Warr and
that Boyce and Connell are "willing to pay or repay the difference between the face of the judgment and the actual total of
the appellant's payments on the contract."

(Brief of Boyce and

Conne 11 , P . 8 )
CONCLUSION
Appellant Warr is entitled to damages from the respondents under the "benefit of the bargain" rule to compensate him
because he has been deprived of the benefit of a good investment
decision.

There is no adequate reason to deny Warr the major

portion of his damages under an anomoly in the law of damages
applied by only a few states.

Utah law (Bunnell) suggests that

the "benefit of the bargain" rule should be followed even in a
"good faith" case.

Even if a "good faith" exception is found,

the conduct of the respondents should not be considered "good
-17Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

faith" because adverse possession in Utah can be avoided by
the simple act of paying taxes, which the respondents neglected
to do.

Warr should not be forced to suffer for their neglect,
Respectfully submitted,

KIRTON, McCONKIE, BOYER & BOYLE
Attorneys for Warr
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